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List of acronyms 
Acronym Meaning 
AC Air cooler 
ADS Automatic depressurisation system 
AI Analog input 
APU Acquisition and processing unit 
AS Application software 
BWR Boiling water reactor 
CCF Common cause failure 
CCW Component cooling water system 
CD Core damage 
CL Communication link 
CP Condensation pool 
CV Check valve 
DI&C Digital instrumentation and control 
DO Digital output 
DWST Demineralized water storage tank 
ECC Emergency core cooling system 
EFW Emergency feed-water system 
ESF Engineered safety features 
HVA Heating, venting and air conditioning system 
HW Hardware 
HX Heat exchanger 
I&C Instrumentation and control 
IDN Inter-division network 
LMFW Loss of main feed-water 
MFW Main feed-water system 
MP Motor-operated pump 
MV Motor-operated valve 
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NEA Nuclear energy agency 
NPP Nuclear power plant 
OECD Organisation for economic co-operation and development 
OS Operating system 
PM Processor module 
PRA Probabilistic risk assessment 
PSA Probabilistic safety assessment 
PTU Periodic testing unit 
RCO Reactor containment 
RHR Residual heat removal system 
RPS Reactor protection system 
RPV Reactor pressure vessel 
RS Reactor scram system 
SL Sensor measuring water level 
SP Sensor measuring pressure 
SR Sub-rack 
ST Sensor measuring temperature 
SWS Service water system 
VU Voting unit 
WDT Watchdog timer 
WGRISK Working group on risk assessment 
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1. Introduction 
In 2015, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Working Group on Risk Assessment 
(WGRISK) completed a study on failure mode taxonomy for reliability assessment of digital 
instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems for probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) [1]. The 
report provides a good taxonomy framework for reliability modelling of DI&C. However, there 
is still a lack of consensus on an appropriate modelling approach for the purpose of PRA. 
Therefore, a three-year WGRISK task Digital I&C PSA – Comparative application of DIGital 
I&C Modeling Approaches for PSA (DIGMAP) was started in 2017 [2]. 
The objective of DIGMAP is to compare modelling approaches for safety-important DI&C 
systems in an example nuclear power plant (NPP) for the purpose of PRA. Through the 
comparison, various approaches and valuable insights concerning e.g. methods, used level of 
detail and quantification issues for future modelling method development can be identified. For 
the benchmark study, a common example plant description [3] has been developed based on 
the DIGREL PRA model [4]. The plant is a fictive boiling water reactor (BWR) plant with 
simplified systems except for the more detailed digital I&C reactor protection system. One 
example accident case is considered (loss of main feed-water, LMFW). Each participant is 
expected to develop its own PRA model based on the provided system layout of the example 
NPP. The different models will be shared, discussed and compared. This report presents the 
VTT’s model to be used in the benchmark study. 
2. Plant and reactor protection system description 
The plant is a generic and simplified BWR plant. The layout of main safety systems is 
presented in Figure 1, and the safety systems are also listed in Table 1. Each safety system, 
except for the reactor protection system, contains only one train. 
Reactor containment (RCO)
ECC pump room
Condensation pool (CP)
Reactor 
scram
system (RS)
EFW_CV
ECC_CV
MFW_CV
 
ADS_MV
 EFW_MV
 ECC_MV
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Figure 1: The layout of main safety systems [3]. 
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Table 1: Safety systems. 
System Acronym 
Automatic depressurization system ADS 
Component cooling water system CCW 
Emergency core cooling system ECC 
Emergency feed-water system EFW 
Service water system SWS 
Heating, venting and air conditioning system HVA 
Main feed-water system MFW 
Residual heat removal system RHR 
Reactor scram system RS 
 
The reactor protection system (RPS) consists of two diverse subsystems, RPS-A and RPS-B. 
Both subsystems contain four divisions. Each division contains its own measurement sensors, 
acquisition and processing unit (APU), voting unit (VU) and sub-rack (SR). Each unit contains 
a processor module (PM) and a communication link (CL) module. Each APU contains analog 
input (AI) modules receiving signals from measurement sensors, and each VU contains a 
digital output (DO) module sending signals to the actuators. In the PM of each VU, 2-out-of-4 
voting is performed based on inputs from the APUs of all division. The layout of the reactor 
protection system is presented in Figure 2. A safety function is actuated if any of the divisions 
sends it an actuation signal. The actuation signals of components are summarised in Table 2. 
Division 1 Division 3 Division 4Division 2
VU 1A
       APU 1A
AI1 AI2
PM
CL PM (2/4)
DO
SR
VU 1B
   APU 1B
AI1 AI2
PM
PM (2/4)
DO
SR
Reactor scram system or  field components
RPViSL2
Water level 
sensor in 
RPV:
RS1
ESF1
CPiST
Temperature 
sensor in 
CP:
ESF4
RCOiSP
Pressure 
sensor in 
RCO:
RS2
RPViSP
Pressure 
sensor in 
RPV:
ESF2
RPViSL1
Water level 
sensor in 
RPV:
ESF3
CL
2AV-CL
3AV-CL
4AV-CL CL
2BV-CL
3BV-CL
4BV-CL
2AA-CL
3AA-CL
4AA-CL
CL
2BA-CL
3BA-CL
4BA-CL
PTU
PM
ID
N
1AV-CL
1AA-CL
1BV-CL
1BA-CL
Reactor scram system or  field components
WDT
 
Figure 2: Reactor protection system layout [3]. 
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Table 2: Actuation signals [3]. 
System Component Control Conditions Signal 
RS Control rods  Open RS1: low water level in reactor 
RS2: high pressure in containment 
RS1 + RS2 
EFW Pump Start RS1: low water level in reactor 
ESF1: extreme low water level in 
reactor 
RS1 + ESF1 
Motor-operated 
valve 
Open RS1: low water level in reactor 
ESF1: extreme low water level in 
reactor 
RS1 + ESF1 
HVA AC cooler Start RS1: low water level in reactor 
ESF1: extreme low water level in 
reactor 
RS1 + ESF1 
ADS Pressure relief 
valve 
Open ESF2: high pressure in reactor ESF2 
ECC Pump Start ESF3: low water level in reactor ESF3 
Motor-operated 
valve 
Open ESF3: low water level in reactor ESF3 
RHR Pump Start RS2: high pressure in containment 
ESF4: high temperature in 
condensation pool 
RS2+ESF4 
Motor-operated 
valve 
Open RS2: high pressure in containment 
ESF4: high temperature in 
condensation pool 
RS2+ESF4 
CCW Pump Start RS2: high pressure in containment 
ESF4: high temperature in 
condensation pool 
RS2+ESF4 
SWS Pump Start RS2: high pressure in containment 
ESF4: high temperature in 
condensation pool 
RS2+ESF4 
 
The 2-out-of-4 voting logic is degraded to 2-out-of-3 if a failure is detected in one of the inputs. 
After two detected failures, the voting logic is 1-out-of-2. If three failures are detected, actuation 
is performed. Spurious actuation is however out of the scope of the study. 
Each division contains a periodic testing unit (PTU) that is common to both subsystems. Some 
of the I&C hardware (HW) failures can be detected by the periodic testing that is performed 
every 24 hours. The PTU gathers the information from I&C components through inter-division 
network (IDN). Each division also contains a watchdog timer (WDT) that is common to both 
subsystems. The WDT can detect some of the HW failures in the PMs of the VUs and SRs in 
real time. 
Each processor module consists of HW, operating system (OS) and application software (AS). 
Other I&C modules consist of HW and OS. The model description [3] contains fictive failure 
data of HW, OS and AS of each module. OS and AS failure probabilities are defined on 
demand basis, and they are assumed to be always undetected. For HW failures, failure rate is 
given and it is divided for failures detected by different fault tolerant features, which are 
automatic testing, periodic testing and full-scope testing. All HW failures are detected by full-
scope testing performed every half a year if they are not detected earlier by other features. 
The model description [3] also provides failure data of mechanical components and common 
cause failure parameters to be used in the models. 
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3. Event tree 
Loss of main feed-water is the only accident scenario analysed in the benchmark study. The 
event tree is presented in Figure 3 and it is also given in the model description [3] to the 
participants of the benchmark study. 
 
Figure 3: Event tree for loss of main feed-water accident. 
4. Basic events 
Basic events of mechanical components are not presented here. They are given in Table 3 of 
the model description [3]. In addition, two basic events are assigned to each measurement 
sensor representing detected and undetected failure. All failures are assumed to be detected 
by full-scope testing. The undetected failure represents the unavailability related to the time 
before the detection when the failure is latent. Respectively, the detected failure represents 
the unavailability related to the time after detection but before repair. The probability of an 
undetected failure is the probability that a failure occurs and after the failure a demand occurs 
before the full-scope testing (performed every half a year). It is calculated as 
𝑃𝑢 = 1 −
1
𝜆𝑇𝑡
(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑇𝑡),                                                                 (1) 
where 𝜆 is the failure rate (2.0E-7/h for sensors [3]), and 𝑇𝑡 is the testing interval (4380 hours 
for full-scope testing). Therefore, the probability of an undetected failure is 4.38E-4 for each 
sensor. The probability of a detected failure is the probability that a failure occurs and a 
demand occurs after detection before the component has been repaired. It is calculated as 
𝑃𝑑 = 𝜆𝑇𝑟,                                                                                         (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟 is the mean time to repair (8 hours for all components). Therefore, the probability of 
a detected failure is 1.60E-6 for each sensor. 
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For an RPS module, there are two HW basic events, detected and undetected failure. The 
probability of the detected failure is calculated by equation (2). The total failure rate (given in 
[3]) is used in the computation because all failures are always detected sooner or later, and 
the mean time to repair is the same regardless of the detection mechanism. The time that a 
failure is latent is included in the probability of the undetected failure. The probability of the 
undetected failure is more complicated to calculate because of various fault tolerant features. 
It is discussed separately in Section 5.1. 
OS and AS basic events are common to all divisions, which means that a common cause 
failure (CCF) between all divisions is assumed if one module fails. The failure probabilities are 
given directly in the model description [3]. For each module, there is one OS basic event. For 
each processor module, there is one AS basic event, which means that AS is not divided into 
smaller parts according to signals that are processed. The basic event represents the failure 
of all signal processing in the module. 
All RPS basic event types and their probabilities are presented in Table 3. All HW basic events 
represent failure of one specific module in a single division only, whereas OS and AS basic 
events represent common cause failure between modules in all divisions. 
Table 3: RPS basic events. 
Module Type of failure Probability 
APU AI Undetected HW failure 8.87E-4 
APU AI Detected HW failure 1.60E-5 
APU AI OS failure 1.00E-5 
APU PM Undetected HW failure 4.52E-4 
APU PM Detected HW failure 1.60E-5 
APU PM OS failure 1.00E-5 
APU PM AS failure 1.00E-4 
APU CL Undetected HW failure 2.29E-3 
APU CL Detected HW failure 4.00E-5 
APU CL OS failure 1.00E-5 
VU DO Undetected HW failure 9.17E-4 
VU DO Detected HW failure 1.60E-5 
VU DO OS failure 1.00E-5 
VU PM Undetected HW failure 4.45E-4 
VU PM Detected HW failure 1.60E-5 
VU PM OS failure 1.00E-5 
VU PM AS failure 1.00E-4 
VU CL Undetected HW failure 2.29E-3 
VU CL Detected HW failure 4.00E-5 
VU CL OS failure 1.00E-5 
SR Undetected HW failure 7.30E-6 
SR Detected HW failure 1.60E-5 
SR OS failure 1.00E-5 
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PTU or WDT failures have not been included in the model explicitly. Scenarios related to them 
are included in the probabilities of undetected HW failures as described in Section 5.1. 
5. Challenging issues 
5.1 Probabilities of undetected HW failures 
The failure data of HW failures is divided according to fault tolerant features [3] as presented 
in Table 4. In the table, F refers to full-scope testing, A refers to automatic testing and P refers 
to periodic testing. The failure rates are divided for different fault tolerant techniques according 
to the fractions given in the table. Some failures can be detected by two or three fault tolerant 
techniques. It is assumed that all HW failures are detected in full-scope testing if they are not 
detected by other means. For example, 60% (P(AF)+P(APF) = 0.4+0.2) of HW failures of an 
APU AI module are detected primarily by automatic testing (performed by the PM of the APU) 
and 20% primarily by periodic testing (performed by PTU). Failures that can be detected both 
by automatic testing and periodic testing (APF) are primarily detected by automatic testing 
because it is performed in real time. If automatic testing fails, one third (0.2/0.6) of failures that 
would have been detected by automatic testing are detected by periodic testing. 
Table 4: RPS hardware failure data [3]. 
Module Failure rate (/h) F AF PF APF 
APU AI 2E-6 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 
APU PM 2E-6 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 
APU CL 5E-6 0.2  0.8  
VU DO 2E-6 0.2  0.8  
VU PM 2E-6 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.1 
VU CL 5E-6 0.2  0.8  
PTU PM 2E-6 1    
PTU IDN 1E-6 0.8  0.2  
SR 2E-6  0.9 0.1  
 
A basic event representing an undetected failure combines all failures not detected by 
automatic testing. These failures can be classified as follows: 
1. Failures that are detected by full-scope testing only 
2. Failures that are primarily detected by periodic testing 
a. Failures detected by periodic testing 
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b. Failures detected by full-scope testing because of a failure of a component 
needed in periodic testing 
3. Failures that are not detected by automatic testing because of a failure of a component 
needed in automatic testing 
a. Failures detected by periodic testing 
b. Failures that cannot be detected by periodic testing and are detected by full-
scope testing 
c. Failures detected by full-scope testing because of a failure of a component 
needed in periodic testing. 
The basic event represents the unavailability before detection (all HW failures are detected 
eventually). A supporting fault tree (not appearing in the actual model) is used to calculate the 
probability of the basic event. 
The supporting fault tree of an undetected APU CL failure is presented in Figure 4. In it, basic 
event APUCL_F represents failures detected by full-scope testing only (case 1 above), and 
basic event APUCL_P represents failures detected primarily by periodic testing (case 2a 
above). The probabilities of these basic events are calculated according to equation (1) so that 
the failure rate is not the total failure rate, but the failure rate related to the detection mechanism 
(0.8 ∙ 5.0 ∙ 10−6 = 4.0 ∙ 10−6 for failures detected by periodic testing, and 0.2 ∙ 5.0 ∙ 10−6 = 1.0 ∙
10−6 for failures detected by full-scope testing). The testing interval is 24 hours for periodic 
testing and half a year for full-scope testing. The AND gate in the fault tree is related to 
scenarios where periodic testing fails, and the failures can only be detected by full-scope 
testing (case 2b above). Basic event APUCL_PF represents failures that would have normally 
been detected by periodic testing, but are detected by full-scope testing in this scenario. There 
are six basic events causing the failure of periodic testing in the PTU: 
- PTUPM_F: HW failure of the PM in the PTU, 
- PTUIDN_F: HW failure of the IDN detected by full-scope testing, 
- PTUIDN_P: HW failure of the IDN detected by periodic testing, 
- PTUPMOS_N: OS failure of the PM in the PTU, 
- PTUPMAS_N: AS failure of the PM in the PTU, 
- PTUIDNOS_N: OS failure of the IDN. 
The probability of APUCL_PF has been calculated according to equation (1). The testing 
interval is half a year. Basic events PTUPM_F, PTUIDN_F and PTUIDN_P represent 
unavailability before and after detection. It is assumed that the detection of a PTU failure does 
not affect the functioning of the RPS, e.g. change the voting logic. Therefore, the probabilities 
of the basic events are sum values of values calculated using equations (1) and (2).  
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Figure 4: Fault tree of undetected APU CL failure. 
The fault tree produces the following minimal cut sets: 
S1-sum 2.29E-03 
 
  Num Prob. % Cumul Prob Name 
  
    1 2.19E-03 95.53 95.53 2.19E-03 APUCL_F  
 
    2 4.80E-05 2.10 97.62 4.80E-05 APUCL_P  
 
    3 3.82E-05 1.67 99.29 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    4.38E-03 PTUPM_F  
 
    4 1.53E-05 0.67 99.96 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    1.76E-03 PTUIDN_F  
 
    5 8.71E-07 0.04 100.00 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    1.00E-04 PTUPMAS_N
  
    6 8.71E-08 0.00 100.00 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    1.00E-05 PTUIDNOS_N
  
    7 8.71E-08 0.00 100.01 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    1.00E-05 PTUPMOS_N
  
    8 3.48E-08 0.00 100.01 8.71E-03 APUCL_PF  
    4.00E-06 PTUIDN_P  
The total probability 2.29E-3 is used in the actual model. It is conservative to multiply the 
probability of APUCL_PF directly with the probabilities of PTUPM_F, PTUIDN_F and 
PTUIDN_P, because a PTU failure needs to occur before APUCL_PF so that the CL failure is 
not detected, but this formula just multiplies the unavailabilities. In addition, PTUIDN_P is 
detected in 24 hours. A more accurate way to perform the calculations could be found, but it 
would require information about test times, such as the difference between the full-scope test 
times of the CL and PTU. The approximation obtained by multiplying unavailabilities is 
considered sufficient, because the CL failure probability is dominated by APUCL_F, and this 
fault tree analysis can already be considered quite a heavy procedure compared to the 
significance of the PTU failure scenarios. 
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The CL failure analysis was presented above, because it is the simplest analysis scenario, 
along with identical digital output module case. Analysis of processor modules and sub-racks 
is more complicated, because also the failure of automatic testing needs to be included in the 
analysis. In the case of an analog input module, scenarios related to the failures of automatic 
testing performed by the APU PM are not included, because the failure of the APU PM itself 
has the same effect as the failure of AI module, and the scenarios are thus covered by PM 
basic events. The analyses are not presented here, but the principles are the same as in the 
CL case. SR is the only case where failures of fault tolerant techniques contribute significantly 
to the probability of an undetected failure, because all failures are detected either by automatic 
testing or periodic testing when the WDT and PTU are working. Because of the same reason, 
the failure probability of a SR is also quite small. 
The approach to calculate probabilities of undetected failures is quite similar to the approach 
presented in [5]. However, in [5], failures of fault-tolerant techniques were not considered, only 
the fault coverages of different techniques. 
5.2 Common cause failures 
Each RPS HW basic event belongs to an alpha factor CCF group of four components, one 
component coming from each division. The CCF parameters are taken from the model 
description [3]. For detected failures, parameters 𝛼3 and 𝛼4 are however set to 0, because 
three detected failures are assumed to cause the actuation of a safety function, which means 
that CCFs with three or four modules cannot contribute to the failure of the safety function. 
The software basic events are common to all divisions, which equals to the case of beta factor 
𝛽 = 1. For each SW basic event, the CCF between RPS subsystems has been modelled with 
beta factor 𝛽 = 0.0280 (which is 𝛼2 in Appendix 1 of [3]). This means that e.g. PM AS fails in 
each division of RPS-A with probability 1E-4, and PM AS fails in each division of both RPS-A 
and RPS-B with probability 2.80E-06. OS basic events of the four AI modules (two in RPS-A 
and two in RPS-B) have been included in an alpha factor group. Again, the parameters are 
taken from the model description [3]. 
It can be noticed that RPS-A and RPS-B are dependent via the PTUs and WDTs. Failures of 
the PTUs and WDTs were modelled explicitly in an alternative version of the model, but the 
core damage frequency related to scenarios where PTU or WDT failure contributes to the 
failure of both subsystems was smaller than 1E-11/year. So it was concluded that PTU and 
WDT failures do not need to be modelled explicitly. 
6. Fault trees 
The model employs small fault trees as building blocks. The fault trees related to the EFW are 
gone through in this section. Other safety functions have been modelled in a similar manner. 
EFW system fault tree (Figure 5) contains actuators and links to the dependent systems. RS1 
is a link to RS1 signal fault tree. ESF1 signal is assumed to fail if RS1 signal fails and is not 
modelled separately. 
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Figure 5: Fault tree of the emergency feed-water system. 
RS1 fault tree (Figure 6) contains signals coming from different divisions under an AND gate. 
 
Figure 6: Fault tree of RS1 signal. 
VU fault tree for RS1 (Figure 7) contains links to fault trees representing VU modules and the 
voting logic. Degraded voting logic has been modelled. Three undetected failures of inputs 
cause the failure of the output. In addition, a combination of two undetected and two detected 
failures of inputs cause the failure of the output if they are in different divisions. According to 
the voting logic, three detected failures cause the actuation of the safety function, i.e. prevent 
the failure. The logic of this fault tree enables CCFs of three and four detected failures to 
appear in minimal cut sets, but such minimal cut sets are prevented by setting 𝛼3 and 𝛼4 
parameters to 0. 
 
Figure 7: Fault tree of the voting unit in division 1 of RPS-B for RS1 signal. 
VU DO fault tree (Figure 8) contains all basic events related to the digital output module. The 
DO module can fail due to undetected or detected HW failure, or OS failure. It is assumed that 
a detected failure does not cause the actuation of the safety function, i.e. a detected failure in 
a VU has similar effect as an undetected failure. It is however assumed that three detected 
failures in redundant VUs cause the actuation and prevent the failure of the safety function. 
This is modelled by setting 𝛼3 and 𝛼4 CCF parameters to 0. The results will contain minimal 
cut sets with e.g. CCF of two modules and one independent detected failure, but such minimal 
cut sets have very small frequencies, and their existence only causes slight overestimation of 
the core damage frequency if anything. 
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Figure 8: Fault tree of the digital output module in division 1 of RPS-B. 
VU PM fault tree (Figure 9) contains all basic events related to the processor module. The PM 
module can fail due to undetected or detected HW failure, OS failure or AS failure. It is 
assumed that a detected failure does not cause the actuation of the safety function, i.e. a 
detected failure in a VU has similar effect as an undetected failure. 
 
Figure 9: Fault tree of the processor module in the voting unit of division 1 of RPS-B. 
SR fault tree (Figure 10) contains links to fault trees representing detected and undetected 
failures of the sub-rack. 
 
Figure 10: Fault tree of the sub-rack in division 1 of RPS-B. 
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SR undetected fault tree (Figure 11) contains basic events representing undetected HW 
failure and OS failure of the sub-rack. 
 
Figure 11: Fault tree of undetected failures of the sub-rack in division 1 of RPS-B. 
SR detected fault tree (Figure 12) contains a basic event representing detected HW failure 
of the sub-rack. 
 
Figure 12: Fault tree of detected failure of the sub-rack in division 1 of RPS-B. 
VU CL fault tree (Figure 13) contains all basic events related to the communication link 
module. The CL module can fail due to undetected or detected HW failure, or OS failure. It is 
assumed that a detected failure does not cause the actuation of the safety function, i.e. a 
detected failure in a VU has similar effect as an undetected failure. 
 
Figure 13: Fault tree of the communication link module in the voting unit of division 1 of RPS-
B. 
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APU fault tree for RS1 (Figure 14) contains links to fault trees containing detected and 
undetected APU failures. Detected and undetected failures are separated because detected 
failures change the voting logic (see Figure 7 for the modelling of degraded voting logic). 
 
Figure 14: Fault tree of RS1 signal from the APU in division 1 of RPS-B. 
APU undetected fault tree for RS1 (Figure 15) contains all undetected APU failures in linked 
fault trees as well as undetected measurement sensor failure and link to the fault tree of 
undetected sub-rack failures. 
 
Figure 15: Fault tree of undetected failures related to RS1 signal from the APU in division 1 
of RPS-B. 
APU CL undetected fault tree (Figure 16) contains basic events representing undetected 
failures of the communication link module. 
 
Figure 16: Fault tree of undetected failures of the communication link module in the APU of 
division 1 of RPS-B. 
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APU PM undetected fault tree (Figure 17) contains basic events representing undetected 
failures of the processor module. 
 
Figure 17: Fault tree of undetected failures of the processor module in the APU of division 1 
of RPS-B. 
AI undetected fault tree (Figure 18) contains basic events representing undetected failures 
of the analog input module. 
 
Figure 18: Fault tree of undetected failures of the first analog input module in division 1 of 
RPS-B. 
APU detected fault tree for RS1 (Figure 19) contains all detected APU failures in linked fault 
trees as well as detected measurement sensor failure and link to the fault tree of detected sub-
rack failure. 
 
Figure 19: Fault tree of detected failures related to RS1 signal from the APU in division 1 of 
RPS-B. 
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APU CL detected fault tree (Figure 20) contains a basic event representing detected failure 
of the communication link module. 
 
Figure 20: Fault tree of detected failure of the communication link module in the APU of 
division 1 of RPS-B. 
APU PM detected fault tree (Figure 21) contains a basic event representing detected failure 
of the processor module. 
 
Figure 21: Fault tree of detected failures of the processor module in the APU of division 1 of 
RPS-B. 
AI detected fault tree (Figure 22) contains a basic event representing detected failure of the 
analog input module. 
 
Figure 22: Fault tree of detected failure of the first analog input module in division 1 of RPS-
B. 
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It may seem unnecessary to have fault trees with only one detected failure basic event. The 
basic events representing detected failures could be moved one fault tree level up. However, 
if detected failures of OS and AS were modelled, the current structure would clearer. It is also 
good to treat undetected and detected failures consistently so that they appear at the same 
fault tree level. 
7. Results 
7.1 Main results 
The core damage frequency is 5.10E-3/year. RPS failures have a quite small contribution to 
the core damage frequency (Fussell-Vesely 8.51E-4), because safety systems do not contain 
any redundancy, whereas the RPS does, and because of the 1-out-of-4 actuation criterion of 
the RPS. 
The most important RPS related minimal cut sets are the following: 
MCA 5.10E-03 S1-sum 5.22E-03 
 
  Num Freq. Prob Name Comment  
 
    1 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__AA-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    2 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__AV-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    3 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__BV-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    4 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__BV-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    5 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__BA-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    6 2.34E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  1.00E-04 RPS__BA-PM_AS_N Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
 
    7 1.40E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  2.80E-06 RPS__V-PM_AS_N-AB 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
 
    8 1.40E-07 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  2.80E-06 RPS__A-PM_AS_N-AB 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
 
    9 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-BCD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   10 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABC 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   11 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ACD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   12 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   13 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-BCD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   14 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-BCD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   15 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ACD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   16 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ACD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   17 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
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  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   18 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABD 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   19 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABC 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   20 5.43E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.32E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABC 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   21 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_AV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   22 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 EFW_MP_D Emergency feed water system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   23 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_BV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   24 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_BV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   25 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 ECC_MP_D Emergency core cooling system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
 
   26 5.03E-08 5.00E-02 LMFW Loss of main feed water 
  4.69E-02 CCW_MP_D Component cooling water system pump stops operating 
  2.15E-05 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
The most important RPS basic events according to Fussell-Vesely are the following (basic 
events of other systems have been removed from the list, including the 20 most important 
basic events): 
 Name  Fuss-Ves Comment 
 
      21 RPS__BV-PM_AS_N 9.88E-05 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      22 RPS__BA-PM_AS_N 9.88E-05 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      25 RPS__AV-PM_AS_N 5.30E-05 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      26 RPS__AA-PM_AS_N 5.30E-05 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      28 RPS__V-PM_AS_N-AB 2.75E-05 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
      29 RPS__A-PM_AS_N-AB 2.75E-05 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
      30 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABD 2.29E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      31 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ACD 2.29E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      32 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-BCD 2.29E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      33 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABC 2.29E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      34 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 2.12E-05 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      35 RPS_BV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 2.12E-05 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      36 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABD 1.23E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      37 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ACD 1.23E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      38 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-BCD 1.23E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      39 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABC 1.23E-05 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      40 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.14E-05 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      41 RPS_AV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.14E-05 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      42 RPS__BA-AI1OS_N 9.88E-06 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
      43 RPS__BA-CL_OS_N 9.88E-06 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      44 RPS__BA-PM_OS_N 9.88E-06 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      45 RPS__BV-DO_OS_N 9.88E-06 Digital output module OS failure, undetectable 
      46 RPS__BV-PM_OS_N 9.88E-06 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      47 RPS__B_-SR_OS_N 9.88E-06 Sub-rack OS failure, undetectable 
      48 RPS__BV-CL_OS_N 9.88E-06 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      49 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABD 8.86E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      50 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ACD 8.86E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      51 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-BCD 8.86E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      52 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABC 8.86E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      53 RPS_BV-DO_HW_U-ABCD 8.49E-06 4x CCF Digital output modules HW, undetected 
      54 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABCD 8.20E-06 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      55 RPS__AA-PM_OS_N 5.30E-06 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      56 RPS__AA-CL_OS_N 5.30E-06 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      57 RPS__AV-CL_OS_N 5.30E-06 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      58 RPS__A_-SR_OS_N 5.30E-06 Sub-rack OS failure, undetectable 
      59 RPS__AV-PM_OS_N 5.30E-06 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      60 RPS__AV-DO_OS_N 5.30E-06 Digital output module OS failure, undetectable 
      61 RPS__AA-AI2OS_N 5.29E-06 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
      62 RPS__AA-AI1OS_N 5.28E-06 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
      63 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABD 4.74E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
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      64 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ACD 4.74E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      65 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-BCD 4.74E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      66 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABC 4.74E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      67 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABD 4.73E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      68 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ACD 4.73E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      69 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-BCD 4.73E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      70 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABC 4.73E-06 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      71 RPS_AV-DO_HW_U-ABCD 4.56E-06 4x CCF Digital output modules HW, undetected 
      72 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABC 4.52E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      73 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-BCD 4.52E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      74 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ACD 4.52E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      75 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABD 4.52E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      76 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABCD 4.39E-06 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      77 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABCD 4.38E-06 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      82 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABCD 4.18E-06 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      83 RPS_BV-PM_HW_U-ABCD 4.12E-06 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      85 RPS__A-CL_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Communication links OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      86 RPS__A-PM_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Processor modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      87 RPS__V-DO_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Digital output modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      88 RPS__V-PM_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Processor modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      89 RPS___-SR_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Sub-rack OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      90 RPS__V-CL_OS_N-AB 2.75E-06 2x CCF Communication links OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      91 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABC 2.43E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      92 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-BCD 2.43E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      93 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ACD 2.43E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      94 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABD 2.43E-06 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      99 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-AB 2.31E-06 2x CCF AI1 OS in RPS-A and -B 
     100 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-BC 2.31E-06 2x CCF AI2 OS in RPS-A and AI1 OS in RPS-B 
     101 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABCD 2.25E-06 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
     102 RPS_AV-PM_HW_U-ABCD 2.21E-06 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
     104 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-AD 2.12E-06 2x CCF AI1 OS in RPS-A and AI2 OS in RPS-B 
The most important RPS basic events according to the risk increase factor are the following 
(basic events of other systems have been removed from the list): 
 Name  Risk incr. Comment 
 
       2 RPS__A-CL_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Communication links OS (RPS-A and -B) 
       3 RPS__A-PM_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Processor modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
       4 RPS__A-PM_AS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
       5 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF AI1 OS in RPS-A and -B 
       6 RPS__V-DO_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Digital output modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
       7 RPS__V-PM_AS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Processor modules AS (RPS-A and -B) 
       8 RPS__V-PM_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Processor modules OS (RPS-A and -B) 
       9 RPS___-SR_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Sub-rack OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      10 RPS__V-CL_OS_N-AB 1.08E+01 2x CCF Communication links OS (RPS-A and -B) 
      11 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-BC 1.08E+01 2x CCF AI2 OS in RPS-A and AI1 OS in RPS-B 
      20 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-AD 9.86E+00 2x CCF AI1 OS in RPS-A and AI2 OS in RPS-B 
      21 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      23 RPS__BA-AI1OS_N 1.99E+00 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
      24 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      26 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ACD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      28 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-BCD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      30 RPS_BA-AI1HW_U-ABC 1.99E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      32 RPS_B_-SR_HW_U-ABC 1.99E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      33 RPS_B_-SR_HW_U-BCD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      34 RPS_B_-SR_HW_U-ACD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      35 RPS_B_-SR_HW_U-ABD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      36 RPS__B_-SR_OS_N 1.99E+00 Sub-rack OS failure, undetectable 
      37 RPS_B_-SR_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      38 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABC 1.99E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      39 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABC 1.99E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      40 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-BCD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      41 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-BCD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      42 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ACD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      43 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ACD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      44 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      45 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABD 1.99E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      46 RPS__BA-CL_OS_N 1.99E+00 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      47 RPS__BA-PM_OS_N 1.99E+00 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      48 RPS__BA-PM_AS_N 1.99E+00 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      49 RPS_BA-PM_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      50 RPS_BA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      51 RPS__BV-DO_OS_N 1.99E+00 Digital output module OS failure, undetectable 
      52 RPS__BV-PM_AS_N 1.99E+00 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      53 RPS__BV-PM_OS_N 1.99E+00 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
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      54 RPS__BV-CL_OS_N 1.99E+00 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      55 RPS_BV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      56 RPS_BV-PM_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      57 RPS_BV-DO_HW_U-ABCD 1.99E+00 4x CCF Digital output modules HW, undetected 
      58 RPS__A-AI_OS_N-BD 1.96E+00 2x CCF Analog input modules OS (RPS-B) 
      66 RPS_A_-SR_HW_U-ABD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      67 RPS_A_-SR_HW_U-ACD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      68 RPS_A_-SR_HW_U-BCD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      69 RPS_A_-SR_HW_U-ABC 1.53E+00 3x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      70 RPS__AV-DO_OS_N 1.53E+00 Digital output module OS failure, undetectable 
      71 RPS__AV-PM_AS_N 1.53E+00 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      72 RPS__AV-PM_OS_N 1.53E+00 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      73 RPS__AV-CL_OS_N 1.53E+00 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      74 RPS_AV-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      75 RPS_AV-PM_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      76 RPS_AV-DO_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Digital output modules HW, undetected 
      77 RPS__AA-CL_OS_N 1.53E+00 Communication link OS failure, undetectable 
      78 RPS__AA-PM_OS_N 1.53E+00 Processor module OS failure, undetectable 
      79 RPS__AA-PM_AS_N 1.53E+00 Processor module AS failure, undetectable 
      80 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      81 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      82 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      83 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      84 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ACD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      85 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ACD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      86 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-BCD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      87 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-BCD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      88 RPS_AA-PM_HW_U-ABC 1.53E+00 3x CCF Processor modules HW, undetected 
      89 RPS_AA-CL_HW_U-ABC 1.53E+00 3x CCF Communication links HW, undetected 
      90 RPS__A_-SR_OS_N 1.53E+00 Sub-rack OS failure, undetectable 
      91 RPS_A_-SR_HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Sub-racks HW, undetected 
      93 RPS__AA-AI2OS_N 1.53E+00 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
      95 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      97 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
      99 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ACD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     101 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-BCD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     103 RPS_AA-AI2HW_U-ABC 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     104 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABCD 1.53E+00 4x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     105 RPS__AA-AI1OS_N 1.53E+00 Analog input module OS failure, undetectable 
     106 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     107 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ACD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     108 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-BCD 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
     109 RPS_AA-AI1HW_U-ABC 1.53E+00 3x CCF Analog input modules HW, undetected 
Table 5 presents total Fussell-Vesely values of HW, AS and OS failures. Total Fussell-Vesely 
values of the sensor types are also presented. The sensors are not counted as RPS 
components. 
Table 5: Fussell-Vesely values of HW, AS and OS failures. 
Component type Fussell-Vesely Portion of the RPS related risk 
Hardware 3.60E-4 42.3% 
Application software 3.58E-4 42.1% 
Operating system 1.35E-4 15.9% 
Water level sensors 3.36E-5 - 
Pressure sensors 1.23E-5 - 
Temperature sensors 1.50E-7 - 
  
RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-06631-18 
24 (27) 
 
 
 
7.2 Detected failures 
The total Fussell-Vesely of detected failures is smaller than 1E-7, so small that different 
quantification algorithms give very different values. Reasons for the small contribution are the 
small probabilities of detected failures and the voting logic, which works so that three detected 
failures cause actuation of a safety function. Furthermore, software failures were assumed to 
be never detected, and spurious actuations were not included in the model. In [6], the 
contribution of detected failures was found high due to spurious actuations. But with the 
specifications given in [3], detected failures could have been left out of the model, and the 
results would not have changed significantly. 
An alternative model version with different voting logic was implemented. In this version, the 
voting logic is 1-out-of-1 after three detected failures, and four detected failures prevent the 
actuation of the safety function. RPS failures have slightly higher contribution to the total 
frequency (Fussell-Vesely 8.54E-4). The addition to the RPS contribution comes from detected 
failures, but still the contribution of detected failures is quite small (Fussell-Vesely 2.72E-6, 
portion of the RPS related risk 0.32%). Obviously, the contribution would increase more if 
detected software failures were modelled, the failure rates of RPS modules were increased, 
the mean time to repair was increased or CCF parameters were increased. It is theoretically 
possible that detected failures could contribute significantly to the core damage risk. 
It can be questioned if it is worthwhile to model detected failures at all when modelling failures 
of start/open signals. Undetected and detected failures could be merged together and treated 
conservatively as undetected. It would simplify fault trees, because there would not be need 
to model degraded voting logic. However, detected failures could become more significant if 
spurious actuations were analysed. 
7.3 Software failures 
Significant portion of the contribution of the RPS to core damage risk comes from application 
software failures due to high probabilities and the assumption of beta factor 𝛽 = 1 for the CCF 
between divisions. The CCF of AS modules between subsystems has a significant 
contribution, because it can cause diverse safety functions to fail and alone cause the core 
damage after the initiating event. 
The AS failure probabilities used in the study are quite large compared to probabilities used in 
some other studies, such as [6]. If AS failure probabilities are decreased to 1E-5, Fussell-
Vesely of the RPS is decreased to 5.29E-4, which means that the relative decrease is 38%. 
The total Fussell-Vesely of AS failures is 3.58E-5, which is 10% of the nominal value in Table 
5. 
A different way of modelling application software was tested with an alternative model version. 
In this version, separate AS basic events were used for different signals (e.g. separate basic 
events of APU PM AS for RS2, ESF3 and ESF2). CCF between different AS in the same 
module was modelled with beta factor 0.028. With this change, Fussell-Vesely of the RPS 
decreased to 7.01E-4, which means that the relative decrease was 18%. The total Fussell-
Vesely of AS failures was 2.08E-4. The reason for the decrease was that e.g. minimal cut sets 
3-8 listed in the beginning of Section 7.1 had much smaller probabilities, and that failure of 
processing an individual signal cannot cause the EFW to fail, whereas failure of all AS in the 
PM can. The contribution decreased even though the total AS failure probability increased, 
because there were more AS basic events with probability 1E-4. 
Furthermore, the above described model version was modified so that the probabilities of the 
AS basic events were divided by three, because three different signals are processed in each 
PM. This way the total AS failure probability of a PM was 1E-4. Fussell-Vesely of the RPS 
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decreased to 5.62E-4, and the relative decrease was thus 34%. The total Fussell-Vesely of 
AS failures was 6.90E-5. 
The analyses described above are summarised in Table 6. 
Table 6: Application software analysis cases. 
Analysis case Fussell-Vesely 
of RPS 
Relative decrease 
of RPS FV 
Fussell-Vesely 
of AS failures 
AS failure probabilities 
decreased to 1E-5 
5.29E-4 38% 3.58E-5 
Separate AS basic events for 
different signals, probabilities 
1E-4 
7.01E-4 18% 2.08E-4 
Separate AS basic events for 
different signals, probabilities 
3.33E-5 
5.62E-4 34% 6.90E-5 
 
When AS failure probabilities are this high, the selection of basic events can affect the results 
significantly. The contents of the AS were not specified for the study. In reality, AS function 
block diagrams should be analysed when selecting the basic events and the probabilities. 
7.4 Fault tolerant techniques 
Table 7 presents the sensitivity studies performed on fault tolerant techniques. The analyses 
were performed by recalculating the probabilities of undetected HW failures under different 
assumptions. The recalculations were performed using the supporting fault trees discussed in 
Section 5.1, and the new probabilities were then imported to the main model in each analysis 
case. The testing intervals of measurement sensors were also changed in the analysis cases 
concerning full-scope testing. The contribution of the RPS to the total risk is studied in each 
analysis case. Table 7 presents also the ratio between the RPS Fussell-Vesely of the analysis 
case and the baseline RPS Fussell-Vesely (8.51E-4), which is calculated by dividing the RPS 
Fussell-Vesely of the analysis case by the baseline value. 
The sensitivity studies show that without automatic and periodic testing the RPS related risk 
increases over 270%. Periodic testing is found more important than automatic testing, because 
communication link failures are not detected by automatic testing and the communication links 
are the most important RPS modules with regard to HW as can be seen in the main results of 
Section 7.1. Most of the unavailability related to RPS HW comes from failures that are not 
detected by automatic testing nor periodic testing. By increasing the coverage of automatic or 
periodic testing, significant improvements could by achieved. If automatic testing or periodic 
testing were able to detect all HW failures, the risk related to RPS HW would be insignificant, 
and SW failures would dominate the RPS risk. The RPS related risk can also be significantly 
decreased by performing full-scope tests more often. The RPS related risk is not very sensitive 
with regard to the periodic testing interval. Even if periodic testing is performed only once a 
week, the risk does not increase much. 
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Table 7: Sensitivity analyses for fault tolerant techniques. 
Analysis case Fussell-
Vesely of RPS 
Ratio compared to baseline 
RPS Fussell-Vesely 
Automatic testing always detects all HW 
failures 
4.92E-4 57.8% 
Automatic testing fails completely 1.70E-3 200% 
Periodic testing always detects all HW 
failures not detected by automatic testing 
4.99E-4 58.6% 
Periodic testing fails completely (PTU 
fails) 
1.97E-3 231% 
Automatic testing and periodic testing fail 
completely 
3.16E-3 371% 
Full-scope testing is performed every 3 
months 
6.70E-4 78.7% 
Full-scope testing is performed every 12 
months 
1.24E-3 146% 
Periodic testing is performed every week 8.86E-4 104% 
Fault tolerant techniques do not fail 8.43E-4 99.1% 
 
With assumption that fault tolerant techniques (PTU, WDT and automatic testing in processor 
modules) never fail, the contribution of RPS decreased less than 1%. This result can be 
considered a lower bound with regard to the probabilities of undetected HW failures, whereas 
the main model provided an upper bound. In Section 5.1, the probabilities were estimated 
conservatively for the main model. Since the lower bound and upper bound are so close to 
each other, it can be concluded that the conservative formula used in Section 5.1 is sufficient, 
and the results would not change significantly if the probabilities were estimated more 
accurately with regard to scenarios where fault tolerant techniques fail. 
8. Conclusions 
This report presented a PRA model of a fictive and simplified BWR plant focusing on digital 
I&C. The model will be used in the international benchmark study organized by WGRISK 
project DIGMAP. The selected modelling approach is close to the previous model of the 
DIGREL project [6] employing small fault trees as building blocks. I&C component failures have 
been divided into detected failures and undetected failures. Significant portion of the 
contribution of the RPS related risk comes from application software failures, along with 
undetected hardware failures. On the other hand, detected hardware failures in the RPS have 
insignificant contribution to the core damage risk, likely because spurious actuations have not 
been analysed. The importance of automatic testing and periodic testing as fault tolerant 
techniques to reduce the risk of undetected hardware failures was recognized in the sensitivity 
studies. Selection of common cause failure groups and parameters, and application software 
basic events are expected to be major issues in the benchmark study. 
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